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TAGS: CSCE, PARM
SUBJECT: JUNE 23 HFAC/CSCE COMMISSION TESTIMONY BY A/S
-- RIDGWAY

1. REPEATED BELOW FOR POSTS' INFORMATION IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT GIVEN BY EUR A/S RIDGWAY BEFORE A JOINT HEARING ON JUNE 23 OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE COMMISSION).

2. BEGIN TEXT:

CHAIRMAN FASCELL, CHAIRMAN HOYER, CHAIRMAN DECONCINI:

THANK YOU FOR THE JOINT INVITATION OF THE COMMITTEE AND THE COMMISSION TO DISCUSS THE MILITARY SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE AND OUR APPROACH TO A NEW NEGOTIATION AMONG THE MEMBERS OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT ON CONVENTIONAL STABILITY IN EUROPE.

CSCE AND THE HELSINKI PROCESS

I UNDERSTAND YOUR INTEREST IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE NEW SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS BOTH TO THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE AND TO WHAT WE HAVE CALLED THE "CSCE PROCESS." I MIGHT BEGIN BY DESCRIBING OUR CONCEPTION OF BOTH THE CONFERENCE ITSELF AND THE "HELSINKI PROCESS."

OF COURSE, THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE IS PRECISELY WHAT THE NAME STATES -- THE ONGOING MEETINGS OF ALL 35 CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES TO REVIEW IMPLEMENTATION AND ENHANCE COMPLIANCE WITH COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN IN THE FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. THIS OCCURS BOTH IN FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS AND AT EXPERT LEVEL MEETINGS ON SPECIFIC CSCE ISSUES, SUCH AS CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES. THE CSCE OR HELSINKI PROCESS, HOWEVER, IS A MUCH BROADER CONCEPT, WHICH IN THE YEARS SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE FINAL ACT HAS BECOME ASSOCIATED WITH THE FULL RANGE OF EAST-WEST CONTACTS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY BOTH WITHIN THE CONFERENCE AND WITHOUT. YES, THE HELSINKI PROCESS IS RELATED TO THE UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN, AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION EMBODIED IN THE FINAL ACT. BUT IT IS NOT LIMITED BY THE STRUCTURE OF CSCE AND ENCOMPASSES BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EFFORTS AMONG ALL EUROPEAN

*AT-AC**Rep FAScell
Rep Hoyer
Rep DeConcini***UNCLASSIFIED**

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STATES OR DIFFERENT GROUPINGS OF STATES. EAST-WEST
ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE DESCRIBED AS PART OF THE "CSCE
PROCESS" NEED NOT BE PART OF THE CONFERENCE ITSELF

BACKGROUND TO CSBMS AND STABILITY TALKS

BEFORE DISCUSSING OUR CURRENT PROPOSALS, I'D LIKE TO
REVIEW, BRIEFLY, THE HISTORIC CURRENTS WHICH LED TO THEM.
SINCE THE LATE 1960S WE HAVE STRUGGLED WITH THE QUESTIONS
OF HOW TO MOVE FORWARD ON FORCE REDUCTIONS, INCREASE
MILITARY TRANSPARENCY, AND BUILD CONFIDENCE. WE HAVE
PURSUED A VARIETY OF AVENUES TOWARD THESE OBJECTIVES. WITH
REGARD TO FORCE REDUCTIONS, THE FOCUS HAS BEEN ON THE MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH BEGIN IN 1973. THE 1975 HELSINKI FINAL
ACT OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AND
BECAME THE MAIN FOCUS OF OUR EFFORTS IN THAT AREA.
EVENTUALLY, AT THE MADRID CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING WHICH
ENDED IN 1983, THIS LED TO THE CREATION OF THE CONFERENCE
ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND
DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE). MEETING IN STOCKHOLM, THE CDE
PRODUCED A SOLID SET OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY BUILDING
MEASURES (CSBMS) IN 1986. HOWEVER, CDE BROUGHT WITH IT A
PROBLEM. WHILE WE BELIEVED THAT FORCE REDUCTION
NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD PROCEED ON A SEPARATE TRACK FROM THE

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, OTHERS
HAVE SOUGHT TO USE THE CDE TO BRING ARMS CONTROL AND
CONFIDENCE BUILDING EFFORTS TOGETHER.

AS THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WAS COMPLETING ITS WORK IN THE
SPRING OF 1986, BOTH EAST AND WEST WERE CONSIDERING WAYS TO
REINVIGORATE CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS, WHICH HAD
BECOME BOGGED DOWN IN MBFR. THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS'
STATEMENT AT HALIFAX IN MAY 1986 SET THE TONE FOR FUTURE
DEVELOPMENTS BY CALLING FOR BOLD NEW STEPS IN CONVENTIONAL
ARMS CONTROL AND FOR SETTING UP A HIGH LEVEL TASK FORCE TO
DEVELOP A WESTERN APPROACH. THIS COMPLEMENTED THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE NATO ARMS CONTROL AGENDA
WHICH ALREADY INCLUDED INF, START, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
IN THE SAME TIME PERIOD, ANOTHER IMPORTANT EVENT OCCURRED,
THE OPENING OF THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN
NOVEMBER 1986. IMPLICIT IN THE CSCE OPENING WAS THE NEED
TO REASSESS EFFORTS WITHIN THE SECURITY BASKET OF THE
CONFERENCE AND THE OVERALL BALANCE BETWEEN SECURITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS.

RELATIONSHIP OF NEGOTIATIONS TO CSCE

AGAINST THIS BACKDROP, THE DECEMBER 1986 BRUSSELS
DECLARATION OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS PROPOSED THAT TWO
DISTINCT NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL SECURITY TAKE PLACE:
ONE AMONG THE 23 NATIONS OF THE TWO ALLIANCES, DESIGNED TO
STRENGTHEN STABILITY IN EUROPE AT LOWER LEVELS OF
CONVENTIONAL FORCES; AND THE OTHER AMONG ALL 35 CSCE STATES
DESIGNED TO BUILD ON AND EXPAND THE WORK OF THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES.

WITH REGARD TO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES (CSBMS), THE RELATIONSHIP TO
CSCE WAS OBVIOUS -- A RESUMPTION OF THE WORK OF THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WOULD REMAIN AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE
CSCE MILITARY SECURITY AGENDA. ALL CSCE STATES HAVE A
DIRECT INTEREST AND A ROLE TO PLAY IN INCREASING
CONFIDENCE, OPENNESS, AND PREDICTABILITY OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE RISK OF
CONFRONTATION ARISING FROM MISCALCULATION OR

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MISUNDERSTANDING.

WHETHER THE NEW CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS WOULD HAVE A RELATIONSHIP TO THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE PROMPTED A LIVELY DEBATE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THEN AND NOW OUR CONCEPTION OF THESE TALKS HAS NOT CHANGED. WE BELIEVE THEY MUST FOCUS ON THE THE ELIMINATION

OF THE NATO/WARSAW PACT IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. SUCH TALKS MUST BE LIMITED TO THE 23 COUNTRIES WHOSE FORCES ARE UNDER DISCUSSION. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED (NNA) COUNTRIES PLAY A STABILIZING ROLE IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY EQUATION, AND WE HAVE NO INTEREST IN SEEING THESE FORCES REDUCED. AT THE SAME TIME, WE DID NOT WANT NNA STATES WHOSE "CHIPS ARE NOT ON THE TABLE" TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO A DIRECT ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT SUPPORT SUCH AN NNA ROLE. OUR CONCLUSION: THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS MUST REMAIN AUTONOMOUS FROM THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE.

NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY IS NOT THE ONLY REASON WE ARE INSISTING UPON AUTONOMY FOR THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS. PROTECTION OF THE BALANCE BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY ISSUES WITHIN THE CSCE CONSTITUTES A SIGNIFICANT LONG-TERM GOAL FOR US. WE BELIEVE THAT TWO SIMULTANEOUS SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS, BOTH FULLY WITHIN THE CSCE, WOULD OVERWHELM THE CONFERENCE, AND OUR EFFORTS IN THE CSCE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA. I AM SURE THAT THE MEMBERS HERE ARE AWARE THAT IT HAS LONG BEEN THE DESIRE OF THE SOVIETS TO TURN THE CSCE INTO A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAVE NEVER THOUGHT THAT THE STABILITY TALKS COULD GO FORWARD IN A VACUUM. THE NEGOTIATION MUST PROCEED WITH FULL REGARD FOR THE BROADER OBJECTIVES OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND FOR THE HELSINKI PROCESS AS I HAVE OUTLINED IT. THAT IS WHY I BELIEVE THE COMPROMISE FORMULA AGREED TO BY NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS IN REYKJAVIK IN JUNE 1987 MEETS THE CONCERNS OF ALL ALLIES. ACCORDING TO THAT FORMULA, THE STABILITY TALKS WOULD TAKE PLACE "WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE PROCESS," BUT THE STABILITY TALKS WOULD RETAIN AUTONOMY WITH REGARD TO THEIR SUBJECT MATTER, PARTICIPATION AND PROCEDURES, AND WOULD MAKE THEIR OWN DECISIONS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. NO, THIS IS NOT EVERYTHING WE WANTED -- IT IS A PRODUCT OF NEGOTIATION WITH OUR ALLIES SOME OF WHOM WANTED A DIRECT TIE TO CSCE. IT IS CONSISTENT WITH U.S. OBJECTIVES BOTH FOR THE STABILITY TALKS AND THE CSCE.

AT THE START, I MADE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE CSCE AND THE CSCE PROCESS. LET ME NOW EXPLAIN, BRIEFLY, WHAT THE PHRASE "WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE PROCESS" DOES AND DOES NOT MEAN TO US AND THOSE WHO SHARE OUR VIEW. FIRST, IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE STABILITY TALKS WILL BE A DIRECT PART OF OR SUBORDINATE TO THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE. THAT FACT IS CLEARLY SPELLED OUT IN OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTONOMY. WHAT IS DOES MEAN IS THAT THE NEW TALKS WILL BE PART OF A CONCEPTION OF HOW STATES SHOULD INTERACT TO ACHIEVE GREATER SECURITY. THEY WILL BE ACCEPTED AS AN ELEMENT IN THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF THE EAST-WEST POLITICAL DIALOGUE. THEY WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE BROADER OBJECTIVES OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS.

THIS APPROACH REFLECTS THE IMPORTANCE OF GOING BEYOND A NARROW DEFINITION OF SECURITY IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. IN THE LONG TERM, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF

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INDIVIDUALS WILL BE JUST AS IMPORTANT TO SECURITY AS MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS. IN THIS REGARD, GIVEN THE CONJUNCTION OF THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH THE NEW IMPETUS TO MOVE FORWARD ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, WE WERE ABLE TO ESTABLISH A DIRECT AND APPROPRIATE LINK TO THE VIENNA MEETING IN ORDER TO INCREASE OUR LEVERAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. WE WILL ALLOW THE NEW SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS TO START ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A BALANCED OUTCOME IN VIENNA THAT INCLUDES IMPROVED EASTERN HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE AND CONCRETE NEW HUMANITARIAN COMMITMENTS.

WHERE ARE WE NOW?

TURNING OUR CONCEPT INTO REALITY, HOWEVER, HAS NOT BEEN EASY. WE HAVE NOT YET AGREED ON LANGUAGE IN VIENNA WHICH WOULD ENSURE THE STABILITY TALKS' AUTONOMY. THERE ARE A VARIETY OF OPINIONS WITHIN THE VIENNA CONFERENCE AND EVEN WITHIN OUR OWN ALLIANCE ON HOW THE STABILITY TALKS SHOULD BE RELATED TO THE CSCE.

WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO ALL THAT WE REGARD THE FOLLOWING AS ELEMENTS OF AUTONOMY FOR THE STABILITY TALKS:

- O INDEPENDENT SCHEDULING;
- O SEPARATE CST CONFERENCE FACILITIES;
- O INDEPENDENT DECISION-MAKING;
- O SEPARATE PROCEDURES APPROPRIATE TO THE NEGOTIATION;
- O PERMANENT CST AUTONOMY, NOT TO BE CHANGED BY CSCE.

THE NNA COUNTRIES' DRAFT CONCLUDING DOCUMENT IS GENERALLY A GOOD BASIS FOR WORK, ALTHOUGH EVEN IT WILL REQUIRE SOME IMPROVEMENTS, INCLUDING ON HUMAN RIGHTS. BUT IT IS VERY SERIOUSLY FLAWED ON THE QUESTION OF AUTONOMY. WHILE THE

NNA ACKNOWLEDGE CST AUTONOMY IN PRINCIPLE, THEIR PAPER PROPOSES PROCEDURES AND MODALITIES WHICH WOULD SUBORDINATE THE NEGOTIATION TO THE CSCE AND PROVIDE AN NNA RIGHT TO OVERSIGHT OF THE DECISIONS OF THE 23. PERHAPS MOST TROUBLING, IT WOULD ALLOW A FUTURE FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO DETERMINE THE FATE OF CST AND ALTER ITS AUTONOMY.

ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW WITHIN NATO ON THE RELATIVE MERITS OF THE NNA SECURITY TEXT, WE AND OUR ALLIES HAVE AGREED TO ACCEPT THE COMPREHENSIVE NNA DRAFT AS A BASIS FOR A FINAL DOCUMENT. WE ARE COMMITTED TO BEEFING-UP THE HUMAN RIGHTS PORTIONS, WHILE PROTECTING CST AUTONOMY ON THE SECURITY SIDE.

WHERE WE WANT TO GO -- IN CSBMS

IN ADDITION TO FOCUSING ON THE NATURE OF MANDATES FOR THE SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS, WE AND OUR ALLIES HAVE ALSO BEEN WORKING INTENTLY ON THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS FOR BOTH THE CSBMS AND STABILITY TALKS. EVEN THOUGH ALLIANCE DELIBERATIONS ARE NOT COMPLETE, I CAN OUTLINE SOME OF OUR PLANS AND OBJECTIVES IN BROAD TERMS.

ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES (CSBMS), THE WEST WILL CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON THE OBJECTIVES WE SUCCESSFULLY PURSUED IN STOCKHOLM -- TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY THROUGH MEASURES DESIGNED TO INCREASE THE OPENNESS AND PREDICTABILITY OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. I BELIEVE THE CSBMS ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM HAVE

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ADVANCED THESE OBJECTIVES. EASTERN IMPLEMENTATION HAS BEEN GENERALLY ENCOURAGING, INCLUDING ON ON-SITE INSPECTION. IN FACT, WE HAVE PRESSED THE SOVIETS TO DEMONSTRATE THE SAME SPIRIT IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR CSCE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS THAT THEY HAVE SHOWN FOR CDE.

THERE REMAIN, HOWEVER, IMPORTANT AREAS IN WHICH THE CSBMS REGIME CAN BE ENHANCED AND EXPANDED. ACCORDINGLY, THE ALLIANCE IS LOOKING AT A VARIETY OF MEASURES. SOME WOULD IMPROVE EXISTING PROVISIONS ON FORECASTING, PRIOR NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. IN THE INTERESTS OF FURTHER OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY, WE ARE ALSO EXAMINING NEW MEASURES. ONE SUCH INITIATIVE, WHICH MIGHT ANCHOR AN ALLIANCE CSBMS PROPOSAL, IS THE EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION ON MAJOR COMBAT UNITS IN EUROPE. ONCE AGAIN, I WANT TO STRESS THAT THESE ARE AREAS IN WHICH ALL CSCE STATES CAN MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION. LIFTING THE VEIL OF SECRECY WHICH SURROUNDS WARSAW PACT MILITARY OPERATIONS IS OF INTEREST TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES. WE

LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH BOTH THE EAST AND THE NNA IN THIS NEGOTIATION.

WHERE WE WANT TO GO -- IN CONVENTIONAL STABILITY

LET ME TURN NOW TO OUR PLANS FOR THE STABILITY TALKS. OUR POINT OF DEPARTURE SHOULD BE THE CHALLENGE NATO FACES IN THE CONVENTIONAL SPHERE. NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DECLARED AT THE MARCH 2 ALLIANCE SUMMIT THAT "THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE IN EUROPE REMAINS AT THE CORE OF EUROPE'S SECURITY CONCERNS." THEY NOTED THAT THE MASSIVE SOVIET PRESENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE, "AT A LEVEL FAR IN EXCESS OF ITS NEED FOR SELF DEFENSE, DIRECTLY CHALLENGES OUR SECURITY AS WELL AS THE HOPES FOR CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN EUROPE." THE CHALLENGE STEMS NOT ONLY FROM MASSIVE, FORWARD-DEPLOYED SOVIET ARMORED FORCES, BUT ALSO FROM LARGE STANDING FORCES IN THE WESTERN PORTION OF THE SOVIET UNION. ASIDE FROM THE EAST'S QUANTITATIVE SUPERIORITY IN KEY CATEGORIES OF COMBAT CAPABILITY, THE WARSAW PACT ENJOYS GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGES OVER NATO AND MAINTAINS A HIGH DEGREE OF SECRECY REGARDING ITS MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

EAST-WEST DISCUSSIONS ON A NEGOTIATING MANDATE, WHICH BEGAN IN FEBRUARY 1987 AT NATO INVITATION, HAVE SHOWN GOOD PROGRESS; FULLY TWO-THIRDS OF THE DOCUMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN AGREED, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES:

- STRENGTHENED STABILITY AT LOWER FORCE LEVELS;
- ELIMINATION OF DESTABILIZING DISPARITIES; AND
- ELIMINATION, AS A MATTER OF PRIORITY, OF THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH SURPRISE ATTACK AND LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVE ACTION.

THIS LATTER CAPABILITY, WHICH THE WEST NEITHER HAS NOR ASPIRES TO, MANIFESTS ITSELF MOST STARKLY IN THE MASS OF WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES, PARTICULARLY TANKS AND ARTILLERY, WHICH ARE CRUCIAL TO THE ABILITY TO SEIZE AND HOLD TERRITORY. THIS IS WHY THE NATO SUMMIT STATEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL CALLS FOR "HIGHLY ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS BY THE EAST AND ... THE ELIMINATION FROM EUROPE OF TENS OF THOUSANDS" OF WARSAW PACT TANKS AND ARTILLERY PIECES.

WE KNOW THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE A DIFFERENT APPROACH. THEY HAVE PRESSED FOR INCLUSION OF EUROPEAN-BASED NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS TALKS. THEY SEEK TO ACCOMPLISH THE LATTER BY MEANS OF A SPECIFIC REFERENCE IN THE

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NEGOTIATING MANDATE TO TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR DUAL CAPABLE SYSTEMS. NATO REFUSES TO NEGOTIATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIS FORUM AND WILL NEGOTIATE ON WEAPONS SYSTEMS ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THEIR CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY. THERE SHOULD BE NO SEPARATE NEGOTIATING CATEGORY FOR DUAL CAPABLE SYSTEMS; THAT WOULD POTENTIALLY SHIFT THE FOCUS OF NEGOTIATIONS AWAY FROM THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE, WHICH IS OF SUCH GREAT CONCERN.

WE ARE COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH THE EAST TOWARD AN OUTCOME WHICH GENUINELY ENHANCES STABILITY AND LOWERS FORCE LEVELS. BUT LET ME CAUTION THAT EVEN OUR BEST EFFORTS WILL HAVE LIMITS. ARMS CONTROL CANNOT ELIMINATE THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN EASTERN AND WESTERN POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND IN THE NATURE OF OUR TWO ALLIANCES. NOR WILL ARMS CONTROL ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMPROVEMENTS TO MAINTAIN A STRONG DETERRENT. FINALLY, THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WILL NOT ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. NEVERTHELESS, IF WE CAN STRENGTHEN STABILITY, AND REDUCE THE LEVEL OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN THE PROCESS, WE WILL HAVE MADE A VERY IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO SECURITY.

AS FOR THE FATE OF MBFR, WE MUST WAIT AND SEE IF A NEW NEGOTIATING MANDATE FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND A BALANCED OUTCOME TO THE VIENNA CSCE MEETING CAN BE ACHIEVED. IN THE MEANTIME, WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO NATO'S DECEMBER 1985 MBFR PROPOSAL, TO WHICH THE EAST HAS YET TO RESPOND IN ANY CONSTRUCTIVE WAY.

TIMING

I'VE OUTLINED U.S. VIEWS ON BOTH THE PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES THAT CONFRONT US. THE NEXT LOGICAL QUESTION IS WHEN THE NEW SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS WILL BEGIN. UNFORTUNATELY, I CANNOT BE CATEGORICAL ON THIS. BEGINNING THE NEW TALKS IS CONTINGENT ON A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING. THE PROSPECT OF AN EARLY CONCLUSION OF THAT MEETING IS IN DOUBT BECAUSE OF THE EAST'S INTRANSIGENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS. WE NEED TO SEE IMPROVED EASTERN COMPLIANCE WITH COMMITMENTS UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. THERE HAS BEEN DEFINITE IMPROVEMENT SINCE THE MEETING OPENED IN NOVEMBER 1986, BUT MORE IS NEEDED. WE ALSO REQUIRE A FINAL DOCUMENT WHICH PROVIDES FOR STRONGER, EXPANDED HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS AND SIGNIFICANT POST-VIENNA FOLLOW-ON ACTIVITIES IN THE HUMAN DIMENSION. WE AND OUR ALLIES ARE WORKING HARD TOWARD AN EARLY

OUTCOME. I CAN'T PROMISE YOU A DATE, BUT I CAN PLEDGE OUR BEST EFFORTS. HOWEVER, I MUST STRESS THAT WE AND OUR ALLIES HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO STAY IN VIENNA AS LONG AS IT TAKES TO ACHIEVE A BALANCED, SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME.

THANK YOU.

END TEXT. SHULTZ
END OF MESSAGE

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